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In this bold and highly controversial book, Sperber and Wilson attempt to
shift the whole centre of gravity of pragmatic theory by locating it firmly in
a general theory of cognition. Outlining that general theory takes the bulk of
the book, so those who have followed technical developments in pragmatics
will not find those issues much advanced here. For the purpose of the book
is otherwise, to outline a single cognitive principle which (it is held) will give
us, along with a theory of attention, almost all we need in the way of a theory
of communication, such a theory in turn having linguistic applications
merely sketched here.1 The book is written in a fluid argumentative style;
easy to read, it is not easy to understand, presuming much that the central
thesis depends on. Perhaps because of the global and speculative aims, there
is little or no reference to recent developments in the theory of meaning.2
This book has already aroused much passion for and much passion
against. Cited by its authors as long ago as 1979, the ideas have been trailered
in a series of articles, with both critics and protagonists taking up provocative
positions (see for example the still useful exchange in Smith, 1982). Thus
when the book finally appeared, extensive airings of these passions were
inevitable (see the peer review in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) 10
(1987), or the exchange in Journal of Semantics 5 (1988)).3 The views have
[1] A second and third volume on pragmatics and rhetoric were projected (vii-viii) and this
reviewer had hoped for some glimpse of these applications before passing judgment on a
disembodied principle, as it were. But there are now a number of applications of these
ideas to linguistic detail, and these perhaps give a better idea of the linguistic interest of the
theory than anything in the book itself; see e.g. Kempson, 1986; Carston, 1988, on the
semantics/pragmatics interface; Blakemore, 1987, on conventional implicatures and
discourse particles; Kempson, 1988, on anaphora; Smith, 1981; Haegeman, this volume,
on tense; Smith & Smith 1988, on conditionals.
[2] For example, there is scarcely any mention of recent work on generalized implicature (see
below) or on the new contextually-sensitive semantic theories or on computational
pragmatics or on computational theories of inference. There are no bibliographic
references to, among others, Atlas, Horn, Barwise & Perry, Heim, and Kamp, despite the
relevance of the work of all those authors to the themes discussed.
[3] The extended history of the ideas, and battles over them, perhaps helps to explain the often
vituperative nature of the controversy.
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been energetically promoted by the authors (who have published numerous
precis elsewhere) and by other adherents. For instance, the ideas play a
central role in three of the survey articles in Newmeyer's (1988) Linguistics:
the Cambridge survey. Thus the views cannot be ignored.
This reviewer might as well declare from the outset that, as regards the
central thesis of the book, he belongs with the ' nays' and, he believes, the
nays must have it. The reasons for the negative assessment of the central
thesis lie on many levels; the book relies on improbable presuppositions
about human cognition; it underplays the role of usage in pragmatic theory;
it ignores many current developments in semantics, pragmatics and the study
of inference; it is too ambitious and globally reductive; and anyway the
theory is obscure and it is not clear how it could be made to have clear
empirical application. But even presuming that this negative assessment of
the thesis is correct, the book is important for a number of reasons: it draws
central attention to the role of contextual inference not only in language
comprehension but in what many have taken to be the heart of semantics;
it has interesting things to say about the nature of context; and it constitutes
a bold attempt to rethink pragmatic theory from the base, considering how
it should fit in with theories of cognition. We are offered, as an alternative to
the admittedly ramshackle but empirically-based observations of much
contemporary pragmatics, a simple unifying vision - foxes and hedgehogs,
splitters and lumpers, cautious clerics and academic prophets could hardly be
more opposed. Thus, regardless of the fate of their thesis, we owe Sperber
and Wilson a debt for bringing all these issues to the forefront.
Yet this reviewer is, like any working pragmaticist, an interested party,
and such is the status of the book, as cause celebre in the theory of
communication, that he can only urge readers to take a look at it and come
to their own opinion. In this review we can merely indicate the nature of the
central thesis, and help to crystallize the issues around which discussion
might most usefully revolve.
1. BRIEF OUTLINE
The book has four chapters. In the first ('Communication') the origins of the
whole theory become clear. In the early 70s Grice's account of meaningnn was
thought by many to give us for the first time the basis for a general theory
of communication (see for instance Lewis, 1969; Schiffer, 1972); however,
various outstanding problems were left beached as philosophy of language
began rapidly to go out of fashion. Of these, one concerned the notion of
mutual recognition of intentions (and how this was to be achieved without
infinite regress of knowledge states) and another concerned how it is that the
content to be communicated could have the natural saliency such that sender
and receiver could co-ordinate on its production and recognition. Sperber
and Wilson's book is an attempt to answer these questions, and then to show
456
REVIEW ARTICLE
that these answers provide more general insights. The answers provided in
Chapter i are: (a) the problems associated with a notion of mutual
knowledge can be avoided by substituting a weaker concept of mutual
manifestness ;4 (b) the requisite notion of saliency can be provided by a
theory of cognitive optimization, to be dubbed Relevance, and not (as the
theorists of the 70s had supposed) by a theory of interactive co-operative co-
ordination (whether as sketched by Lewis (1969) or Grice's Co-operative
Principle). The same notion of saliency can then be used in the definition of
'mutually manifest' in (a).
Chapter 2 outlines a speculative psychology of inference likely to leave
psychologists, logicians, semanticists and computer scientists in some degree
of apoplexy.5 All inference, it is claimed, is deductive (even if the premises
have to be guessed in various ways) and proof-theoretic, that is to say
computed over the syntax of logical forms. Sperber and Wilson make a large
number of very specific assumptions here and they offer, with charming
hubris, the 'outline of a formal deduction system intended to model the
system used by human beings in spontaneous inference' (94). There have
been various attempts (unreferenced by Sperber and Wilson) to restrict
deductive processes so that they are more in line with psychological
plausibility; Sperber and Wilson opt for a simple elimination of 'intro-
duction-rules' (e.g. the inference from p to p or q) in order that the
implications of any deduction will be strictly finite (a move required to make
sense of their principle of Relevance).8
This chapter has to be read in the context of a modified Fodoreanism, that
is an assumption of cognitive modularity, with a distinction between 'central
processor' and specialized input modules (vision, language, etc.).7 The
modification is that whereas Fodor assumes the 'central processor' works
mysteriously along non-deductive lines (and is thus sceptical of scientific
advance here), Sperber and Wilson present their deductive system as the
central processor itself, processing logical forms provided by the different
input devices. The logical forms are 'structured sets of concepts', each
concept associated with an address in memory to which are attached further
concepts that may be processed. A freshly input logical form can be
[4] The alleged advantages of mutual manifestness over mutual knowledge have been a focal
point in discussions of Sperber and Wilson's ideas, and they need not be discussed here;
see Smith (1982) and the BBS peer review.
[5] See for example the articles by Gazdar and Good, and by Wilks in Smith (1982); and the
comments by Hinkelman, Macnamara, Russell and Seuren in BBS.
[6] No proofs or formal properties of the system Sperber and Wilson envisage are actually
given. It is not self-evident for example that the removal of introduction-rules, but the
retention of commutativity laws (BBS 10: 741), will be sufficient to ensure finite
consequences from finite premises (see Seuren's comments, BBS 10: 733). Besides, as
Gazdar and Good (1982: 90) pointed out, some sets of intuitively non-trivial inferences
would seem to be essentially infinite.
[7] See Fodor (1983), whose ideas and style form an essential backdrop to this book.
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processed to yield its intrinsic deductive content, or it can be processed
together with existing assumptions to yield CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATIONS (the
inferences that follow only from the conjunction of the old and new
information).
This chapter is out of line with nearly all the received wisdom about the
nature of intuitive and ampliative inference, views which have motivated the
many twentieth-century experiments with non-deductive reasoning systems
(with inductive calculi, mental models, abductive and practical reasoning
systems, and most recently non-mononotic default systems).8 Sperber and
Wilson's justification for the departure is, essentially, the parsimony of bold
simplicity. But there is a narrow line between the simple and simplistic, here
surely transgressed. And the supposedly simple turns out to have many
difficulties of its own.9
[8] Of these, they discuss only inductive calculi, arguing that degrees of inductive strength can
be captured in terms of the processing history of assumptions; Johnson-Laird's (1983)
'mental models' approach which argues that all the experimental results point to
deduction-like results being achieved by non-deductive reasoning, is rejected without
argument except that deduction is efficient (102).
[9] It would take a much longer review to spell all these out; but see for example Seuren's BBS
commentary (any critique is hampered by the fact that, as mentioned, no formal properties
of such a system are given). One example is the attempt to justify the absence of an &-
introduction rule. In order to handle the inference:
the authors include the following rule in the logical entry (in the memory location) for ' & ' :
This together with:
will get us the same result, namely r. But how then are we to get the corresponding inference
(cf.their example on p. 109):
Avoiding &-introduction would seem to lead to an infinity of elimination rules. (Unless, of
course, the sentential variables here are schematic rather than atomic letters; but if they are
schematic we would need a complex parser that never lost track of the atomic propositions.)
Faced with these sorts of problems, Sperber & Wilson in the end retreat and admit the use
of non-deductive heuristics to ape deduction (102). The admission is damaging: any
experimental results favouring 'introduction-rule' reasoning can be attributed to these
heuristics, making their claims untestable; and once one has admitted heuristics-that-ape-
deduction, why not go the whole hog as Johnson-Laird (1983) advises?
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Chapter 3 , ' Relevance' (R), brings us to the heart of the matter. This is the
cognitive principle which is to give us at once (a) the account of saliency so
needed in a Gricean theory of communication, (b) the principle controlling
the operations of the deductive device. It amounts, disappointingly perhaps,
to just the 'biggest bang for the buck', here essentially maximal deductive
yield for minimal processing effort. Thus, on the analogy to industrial
productivity (125), R equals output over input, or:
E (number of contextual effects)
R =
C (cost of effort involved in obtaining E)
We are warned though that there may be no single currency in which to
measure E and C, for C may vary with one's mood, tiredness, etc., and be
assessed in terms of'symptomatic physico-chemical changes' (130).10 Indeed,
R is not itself mentally represented or an object of computation, but is more
an extrinsic constraint on the processing system (132).
Nevertheless, if R is to be objectively assessed, there must be some
measures of E and C we can turn to. The measure of processing cost C is
admittedly problematic (130). Without justification, Sperber and Wilson
later seem to presume that there is some relation between the surface
complexity of English syntactic structures and the effort required to process
the logical forms derived from them (by the linguistic module, not the central
processor). E, on the other hand, can be characterized as the sum of
contextual effects, consisting of: (i) the contextual implications of a logical
form in the context of other assumptions (and we now see why we must limit
deduction to obtain finite implications); (ii) the strengthening or weakening
of old assumptions.11 Since the yield of contextual implications itself depends
on the size and content of the 'context' (understood as the set of salient
accessible assumptions), E will be unrestricted in value unless the context is
somehow strictly limited. How? Well by R of course! The context is
expanded from that minimally given by the last state of the deductive device,
by incrementally looking up further connected assumptions in memory, and
so on, until processing achieves a set of contextual effects balancing the effort
required to derive them. R thus controls the basis for assessing R; this is one
of a number of apparent circularities in the chapter (see below).
All this has nothing special to do with language. R applies equally to the
[10] Sperber and Wilson's caution here is meant to invalidate the well-known critique by
Gazdar and Good (1982) of any kind of numerical equation of this sort. See footnote 15
below.
[11] Having rejected a calculus of subjective probabilities, Sperber and Wilson here presume
some computation of rough confirmation values (111 ff.). They hope thereby to enable the
deductive device to handle contradictions without generating infinite conclusions, by
accepting the premise with the higher confirmation value. Sperber and Wilson have to add
confirmation values to their account of Relevance, otherwise reminders, non-obvious
tautologies, and the like would be ir-Relevant.
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processing of smells, noises, trains of thought and the whole structure of
attention, for R is a globally ambitious theory of central thought processes
(151 ff.). But equally R must apply to linguistic input. Indeed, communication
turns out (it is claimed) to rely critically on R, as a communicative act works
by presenting a stimulus that is naturally salient given R and is presented as
worth processing by the standard of R. We are then given (as the last of a
series of definitions) the PRINCIPLE OF RELEVANCE : ' every act of ostensive
communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance'
(158). This principle is explicitly intended to replace Grice's Co-operative
Principle with its well-known maxims of conversation, and the differences are
listed (161-162): (i) R is weaker but more explicit; (ii) R is an automatic
principle that works, unlike the CP, without any overt knowledge of it;
(iii) R applies both to 'what is said' and 'what is implicated'.
It is only in the last 70 pages, Chapter 4, that linguistic issues are directly
addressed. The Fodorean dogma of grammar as an input system, and the
Chomskyan dogma that grammar and communication are only accidentally
linked, are the opening premises. The inferential basis of communication (a
la meaningnn) is, it is claimed, independent of the subservient specialism of
coded verbal communication, which always ultimately depends on the
inferential umbrella (a general sentiment in pragmatic theory but forcefully
expressed here). The goal of pragmatics, we are told, is to explain how a
'hearer' (sic) identifies 'which assumptions made manifest by [the speaker's]
utterance are such that it is mutually manifest that the speaker intended to
make them manifest' (179). The task can be broken down into a number of
subtasks: (a) disambiguation, (b) identification of the proposition expressed
(for example by resolution of anaphora), (c) identification of the intended
mood, (d) the calculation of Relevant contextual implications.
The most interesting ideas here are the very brief discussions of (a) and (b).
Grice noted that identification of 'what is said' depends on prior
disambiguation; Sperber and Wilson claim that R is crucially involved - the
chosen reading is the one that gives most contextual effects (for least effort
as always). The authors recognize a problem here: if grammar is a Fodorean
input module, there would be no feedback possible from the central
processor to the control of the processing in the input module, so every
reading of some constituent would have to be submitted to the central
processor (where R rules supreme) for disambiguation by R (186). Turning
to the identification of the proposition expressed, Sperber and Wilson note
that sentences do not generally express complete propositions: 'semantic
representations are incomplete logical forms, i.e. at best fragmentary
representations of thoughts' (193). A semantic representation has thus to be
EXPLICATED into a full logical form by the resolution of anaphora, and the
narrowing of semantic generality (thus John's book is good might express the
proposition' the book by John is good' or' the book John is reading is good',
etc.). Such a 'development' of a logical form is called an EXPLICATURE and
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is to be distinguished from an IMPLICATURE, which is a contextual implication.
Yet the notion of explicature is never properly defined nor satisfactory
diagnostics given. What guides the development of an explicature? R of
course; whatever fleshing out of a logical form maximizes deductions (or at
least contextual effects) will be favoured. The notion of an explicature has an
implicit anti-Fodorean corollary: semantics, understood as the assignment of
complete logical forms and their truth-conditions, can no longer belong to
the language input module, which will now output mere fragments of logical
form.12
Implicatures are now just contextual deductions. Sometimes though, as in
incomplete answers, one may need to hypothesize an extra premise in order
to get a deduction that would make an utterance Relevant:
A: 'Would you fly a Zanussi?'
B: ' I wouldn't fly any cheap helicopter'
implicated premise: ' A Zanussi is a cheap helicopter'
implicated conclusion: ' B wouldn't fly a Zanussi'
Grice's examples of Relevance implicatures are indeed like these implicated
premises: but Sperber and Wilson do not dwell on the fact that they are
formed not by deduction but by the kind of creative hypothesis formation
that most observers have thought to be central to a theory of implicature (see
below). The authors do have some interesting things to say about the
INDETERMINACY of some implicatures; there may be a number of further
potentially implicated premises (for example ' cheap helicopters are danger-
ous'), that may yield further deductions ('Zanussis are dangerous'), and
there may be doubt as to whether they were meant to be mutually manifest
(196 ff.).
The chapter contains sections dealing with the pragmatic effects of stress
and marked word order, presupposition, tropes and speech acts, each too
short to be more than a summary of the authors' previously published views
on these subjects, without defence against earlier objections. Each is likely to
raise more questions in the reader's mind than it answers; for instance how
the central processor has access to surface features like stress and word order,
how the treatment of presuppositions as entailments could possibly explain
their defeasibility and projection properties, and so on. The book ends
abruptly without conclusions.
2. ASSESSMENT
As should be clear from the summary, this book is more a polemical attempt
to force a paradigm shift in favour of a particular approach to cognition than
12] This corollary of Relevance theory is explored in Kempson, 1986, and is discussed further
below. One unexplained problem with this picture is how the central processor can reason
at all with un-explicated fragmentary logical forms as input.
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it is a detailed contribution to linguistic pragmatics.13 The approach requires
the reader to buy a set of very specific, and to many minds implausible,
assumptions: Fodorean modularity of a specific kind, with a restricted kind
of deduction as the heart of central processing, a translation of all input
perception into a simple canonical 'logical form', a governing cognitive
principle that is not itself an object of processing, a subjective measure of
effort being the main limit on processing, and so on. If you do not buy these
assumptions, the theory will be untenable in its entirety. Even if we buy these
assumptions, the theory to my mind never quite gets off the ground for two
reasons: the first is lack of internal coherence and clarity, and the second
uncertainty of external application. Let me take these up in turn.
A central puzzle is exactly how R is really meant to work. Let us take for
example the claim that R predicts a unique, intuitively correct, interpretation
of an utterance.14 As outlined, R is a function of (measures of) contextual
effects (E) balanced by processing costs (C), related, say, as R = E/C (though
not thus subjectively assessed).15 This allegedly yields unique interpretations.
Yet a close reading of the text indicates that how the equation is solved
varies. Sometimes R has a predetermined value V, such that contexts are
[13] The polemical nature of the writing has produced more heat than light (see for example the
exchange in BBS). For example, neo-Gricean pragmaticists are treated as strawmen,
allegedly reducing pragmatic inference to coded communication; in fact there is a large
measure of agreement on the very features that Sperber and Wilson think so distinctive of
their own work, like the essentially inferential nature of pragmatics (see for example the
responses by Bach & Harnish and Recanati in BBS 10:712). There is a lack of proper,
helpful reference at many points; for example, in a theory aiming to give an account of
implicature it is distinctly odd to have not a single reference to the work of Atlas, Horn,
Hirschberg, and others; it is also strange to have no reference to earlier attempts to
construct a concept of relevance (e.g. Dascal, 1977); and, given the computational nature
of the theory, peculiar not to have extensive reference and comparison to problem-solving
and inference in AI. There is inconsistent hyperbole, so that, for example, we are sometimes
told that R will pick out exactly one interpretation (see next footnote), sometimes that
interpretations will depend on how tired a 'hearer' is (131-132), that they may be
indeterminate, and so on. Stipulation often replaces proper argumentation, as with the
dismissal of Johnson-Laird's ideas (102). These would be serious complaints against a
work in a less polemical or speculative genre; but they do render the book unusable as a
text, and potentially hazardous in the hands of the untutored.
[14] The power of R to yield unique determinate solutions (169) is further stressed in Wilson
& Sperber (1986: 80): 'the first accessible enrichment consistent with the principle of R is
the only enrichment consistent with the principle of R'; 'it is easy to show that every
utterance has at most one interpretation which is consistent with the principle of relevance'
(1986: 76).
[15] Gazdar and Good (1982) discussed at length the difficulties of taking R to be a function
of this sort. Sperber and Wilson (1982b: 109 n. 1; and in the book under review, p. 130)
in turn reject the characterization, but what they suggest instead only increases the puzzle
- R must achieve (at least approximately) the effects of such a function without actually
being computed in this way. See also Hinkelman (BBS 10:720). For the record, Hinkelman
and Levinson are said by Sperber and Wilson to confuse maximal relevance and optimal
processing for optimal relevance (BBS 10: 744-745). It remains unclear why optimal R is
supposed to escape these dilemmas.
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expanded till V is satisfied (142) (but since context can be expanded in many
different, equally R-full ways, how can we get the one correct expansion?).
Sometimes R is a comparative measure, selecting the best interpretation from
competing ones (144, 153). This would clearly involve comparison of
different interpretations; but obviously to compare interpretations would
involve computing each of them, thus additively increasing C, so R predicts
it will be cheaper to pick any one interpretation at random! (Sperber and
Wilson are aware of this difficulty, and suggest heuristics must exist that
allow estimation of costs without computation (131); and so they must, and
must be described and shown to work, if the theory of R is to survive.)
Sometimes, apparently, C has a theshold value such that the first accessible
E-yielding context is automatically selected (178, 185; see also my footnote
14). But if only R is fixed, there is no determinate solution; if C is fixed too,
then comparing interpretations might just exhaust C without any solution.
And if R and E are fixed, then again we may fail to find either a unique
solution or any solution yielding sufficient E for the computed C. In fact
none of these ways of solving the equation are guaranteed (or even likely) to
give a unique solution; and each way of solving the equation is likely to give
a different solution. The reader thus comes away from each sample analysis
with the distinct impression of sleight of hand, not the impression of a
demonstration that R can explain the inferences in question.16
The second main problem derives directly from the first. If the account is
to be of any use, R must make clear predictions, or at the very least it should
be possible to falsify R. But unfortunately R doesn't seem to have that kind
of clear application. For one thing, in the present state of psycholinguistic
knowledge, we have no way of estimating processing costs C (Sperber and
Wilson, no doubt correctly, reject some operational estimate in terms of
number of deductive steps (130)). Secondly, it is always possible to adjust the
alleged contextual premises to make the account fit the scheme. Thirdly, as
described, R could be rather differently computed with rather different
results. The mode of argumentation lends further to this sense that the theory
is self-fulfilling: the job is to show that the intuitively correct interpretation
of some utterance conforms with R, indeed is the only interpretation that
conforms to R; we then try to establish how it so conforms, finding a good
enough post facto story about large amounts of effects E in some hypothesized
context for small amounts of effort C. But this simply doesn't look like any
[16] Clearly this reviewer is not alone in this impression: compare for example: 'In general,
one gets an uneasy feeling about the value of some of the explanations proposed in
Relevance, akin to the feeling experienced when reading teleological explanations in
evolution or functionalist explanations in sociology' (Russell's comment in BBS 10:731).
Other commentators express an exasperation with the special mix of bold assertion and
lack of clarity that pervade the book.
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advance on the ex post facto Gricean accounts that Sperber and Wilson
complain about (37).17
However, above and beyond all this, what a priori reason is there to think
that these two factors E and C are the crucial factors determinative of
utterance interpretation? E is a very specific measure of informational
richness; most pragmatic theorists assume two such measures, incom-
mensurable, indeed intrinsically opposed to each other (see for example Atlas
& Levinson, 1981; Horn, 1984, both drawing on many sources). C is a
measure of inference-cost; yet all the evidence points to inference being
'cheap' and profligately employed without waiting for input that would
make it unnecessary, while a quite different kind of cost, associated with the
production of marked and prolix expressions, is demonstrably determinative
of language use (as shown for instance by Zipf, 1949). Sperber and Wilson
rightly insist on the fundamental role of inference in coded communication;
but the very reason for that role is the extraordinary effortlessness of human
inference.
Sperber and Wilson write with the fervour of those who have discovered
the philosopher's stone, a single principle that will render tractable all the
mysteries of attention, trains of thought and, as a mere by-product as it were,
language comprehension. Many observers simply cannot understand why
they think there should be such a thing, let alone why they think R, with its
uncertainties of construction and application, could be it.
For the non-believers, there is still much of value in this book. There is a
serious attempt to patch up Grice's theory of meaningnn; and this should be
compared to the rather different tack taken for example by Perrault and
Cohen in AI (see Perrault, 1987). There is a forceful emphasis on the essential
role of inference in the interpretation of coded communication. This is of
course a tenet shared by all pragmaticists (pace Sperber and Wilson,
pp. 14 ff.), but the authors push the account further and in most interesting
ways, arguing that disambiguation and propositional determination depend
fundamentally on pragmatic inference (more on this in a moment). There is
an important argument against the idealization wherein context is taken to
be the conversational 'common ground', and in favour of a view where
context is seen as a set of premises invoked from that background (or
constructed if necessary) by pragmatic principles.18 There is an attempt,
[17] Sperber and Wilson's R is supposed to be a simple computational model, and so it is
reasonable to ask that it be clarified by a flow-chart. Attempts by readers to do this founder
on just too many uncertainties (see for instance Hinkelman, in BBS 10:721; my own
attempt came out rather differently). Sperber and Wilson would do us a service by trying
themselves. One problem here is how to compute incommensurables - effort is metered in
'physico-chemical changes', while effects are measured in two currencies (i) the cardinality
of contextual implications; (ii) confirmation strengths.
[18] The in vocational view of context is one currently being explored in a number of rather
different traditions: for example, in AI under the rubrics of 'frames' and 'focus' (see
Sidner, 1986), and in anthropological linguistics under the rubric of'contextualization'
(see Gumperz, 1983; Silverstein, 1988).
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perhaps for the first time, to say something systematic about the
indeterminacy of pragmatic inferences (a thesis not sufficiently pursued in the
book). Above all, and most controversially perhaps, there is a forceful
attempt to shift the whole centre of gravity of pragmatic theorizing away
from the study of usage principles to the study of cognitive principles.
3. SOME LEADING ISSUES
The theory of meaning has been dogged by the tendency to generalize from
the nature of meaning in one limited linguistic phenomenon to the nature of
meaning as a whole. For Sperber and Wilson the focal phenomena are the
classic particularized Relevance implicatures illustrated by Grice, typified by
the partial answer to a question. Meanwhile, the implicatures which have
been focal to Neo-Gricean pragmatic theory (and to Grice's own central
interest with the pragmatics of the connectives) are the generalized
conversational implicatures (GCIs) attributable to the two maxims of
Quantity and to Manner (see Horn, 1972; Gazdar, 1979; Atlas & Levinson,
1981; Horn, 1983, 1984, 1985; Levinson, 1987a, b; Atlas, 1989; Horn, 1989).
These latter inferences are scarcely mentioned in the book, except to dismiss
them as ' untypical examples' (36-37), best treated as explicatures (262 fn
4).19 They have been focal to the Neo-Griceans because they have immensely
regular, cross-linguistic generality, and interact closely with linguistic
structure and meaning. For example, on the basis of GCI theory we are able
to predict, thanks to Horn (1972, 1989), that no language is likely to
lexicalize 'not all' in the same way that it is likely to lexicalize 'not some'
as say none. Cross-linguistic predictions of that sharpness are actually rather
rare in linguistic theory, and are not to be lightly dismissed.
Sperber and Wilson would no doubt agree that GCIs and the classic
Relevance implicatures are different in kind (the former are presumably
always explicatures, although that notion is never properly defined); but they
are committed to the wholesale reduction of implicature (including GCIs)
and the whole Gricean apparatus of maxims to R (161).20 Apart from the
impossibility of reducing countervailing principles to one mega-principle (see
[19] Sperber and Wilson's response to my earlier complaint about this dismissal is to repeat the
charge and to assert that 'His [Grice's] best-known examples are particularized
implicatures; the discussion of generalized implicatures is restricted to a few cases; and
there is no evidence that he [Grice] saw the distinction as theoretically significant' (BBS 10:
748). In fact, Grice's main purpose in developing the theory of implicature was to give an
account of the meaning of natural language connectives in terms of truth-functional
content overlaid by generalized conversational implicature. Hence the bulk of Grice's
unpublished William James lectures is devoted to GCIs.
[20] Curiously, they don't repeat in this book their earlier (Wilson & Sperber, 1981) detailed
attempt at reductionism of all the Gricean maxims to R, apparently taking it as more or




for instance Horn, 1984, 1989; Levinson, 1987 b; Sadock, 1986), the central
problem with this reductionism is that GCIs are GENERALIZED, that is they go
through unless there are reasons to think otherwise; in short they are
preferred interpretations, and fall into the category of non-monotonic
default inferences now being energetically explored in Cognitive Science (see
Ginsberg, 1987). But R cannot predict any stable kind of inference without
a constant context, since it is the derivation of particularized contextual
effects that satisfies R. R is thus a theory of 'nonce-inference', of speaker-
meaning, and utterance-token-meaning. GCI theory is in contrast a theory of
preferred or default interpretation, of utterance-type-meaning. There can be
no way to get the universal regularities of GCI predictions out of a theory of
'nonce-inference'; relevance theory was simply not concocted to deal with
GCIs, and should relinquish ambitions in that direction. (Equally, GCI
theory may have little to say about 'nonce-inference', although see
Hirschberg's (1985) unification of generalized and particularized Quantity
implicatures.)
The question then arises whether R at least offers a reasonable account of
the classic Relevance implicatures which are the focal phenomena that the
theory was designed around. Curiously, the account seems strangely
inadequate here, even assuming that the internal difficulties with the theory
could be patched up. The problem is that the essentially interesting features
of these inferences are non-deductive. Consider the following (or equally
Sperber and Wilson's example (5) on pp. 121-122):
A: 'Where are my chocolates?'
B: 'The dog is looking very sleepy.'
Somehow, presuming the relevance (or co-operativeness) of B's reply, we
supply not only an implicated conclusion (perhaps ' the dog may have eaten
your chocolates') but also the necessary premises (say, 'if dogs eat chocolates
they get very sleepy').21 The premises may even be counterfactual (as here,
or premise (e) in Sperber and Wilson's more complex example just cited), so
they cannot just be retrieved from memory as the authors sometimes seem to
suggest. So here lies the central mystery posed by this kind of implicature:
WHAT KIND OF INFERENCE IS SO POWERFUL THAT IT CAN PROVIDE BOTH THE
PREMISES AND THE CONCLUSIONS to an argument? (Levinson, 1985). Un-
fortunately, the theory of R does not help; it merely tells one how to check
the R-value of the conclusion once you have the premises. Sperber and
Wilson recognize the role of such creative hypothesis formation, but they
somehow lose sight of its centrality, claiming instead that 'the formation of
[21] Of course this will not be a premise in a deductive argument, but it might be one in an
abductive one (see Hobbs, 1987).
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assumptions by deduction is the key process in non-demonstrative inference'
(83)-22
A further problem is that the pre-theoretical notion of relevance is not well
captured by R, because R is an informational measure (balanced by effort),
whereas pre-theoretical relevance is largely about the satisfaction of others'
goals in interaction, and the satisfaction of topical and sequencing constraints
in discourse, as in the expectation that an answer will follow a question in the
example above (see for example Dascal, 1977; Holdcroft, 1987; Levinson,
1987b: 74 ff.). Although Sperber and Wilson respond by saying (119 f.), in
effect, so much the worse for pre-theoretical relevance, their R will leave
quite unexplained the tie between questions and answers, between questions
and helpful non-answers (A: 'What's the torque wrench look like', B:
'There's one in front of you'), between greetings and greetings, and in
general all the things some theory of relevance ought to explain.23
Thus, on the face of it, R fails to account both for the type of implicature
focal to GCI theory and for the prototype cases of implicature attributable
to pre-theoretical relevance. But Sperber and Wilson are of course correct
that we do need theories of particularized implicature. Here, readers should
know that there are alternative theories available, more closely attuned to
concepts of pre-theoretical relevance. There are a number of interesting
attempts to model the inference to others' interactional goals within the
literature on AI planning systems (Allen, 1983; Pollack, 1986), and these
have been made the basis of a theory of implicature by Thomason (1987) and
McCafferty (1987). Discourse analysts, of course, have attempted to spell out
the sequencing and topical constraints underlying the notion of a pertinent
response (see e.g. Brown & Yule, 1983; Levinson, 1983: Ch. 6). Meanwhile,
there are a number of interesting computational theories of'nonce-inference'
(often purveyed under the rubric of LOCAL PRAGMATICS), including Hobbs'
(1987) abductive account of implicature, and the outstanding work by
Hirschberg (1985; in press) on non-generalized Quantity implicatures.
One final issue: as we have noted, Sperber and Wilson draw attention
(under the rubric of'explicatures') to the role of pragmatic inference in the
[22] In reply to an earlier complaint of mine about this problem, Sperber and Wilson (BBS
10:749) gesture to heuristics, like affirming the consequent. But that of course is exactly the
focus of the theories of abductive inference which they eschew.
[23] Another way of putting the problem: pre-theoretical relevance is an INTERACTIONAL issue
•- A's utterance is relevant for a particular interlocutor B trying to do something in
particular. In contrast R is a cognition-internal measure; what is to guarantee that R-for-
A is R-for-B (the Principle of R, in effect 'say something which is optimally R', does not
specify R-for-whom)? Pre-theoretical relevance is partly about bridging A's concerns and
B's concerns, about A taking cognizance of B's point of view, etc. (cf. Millikan's comment
in BBS 10:725^). Incidentally, Sperber and Wilson's own position is none too clear; on
the one hand R doesn't need to be known, let alone computed, because it is a mental
automatism (162); on the other mutual awareness of the Principle of R seems an essential
prerequisite to utterance processing.
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determination of a proposition expressed by an utterance. This is one of the
most important issues raised in the book, but this potentially controversial
point is nicely illustrated rather than systematically argued for. Select
philosophers have long held this point of view (Strawson, 1952), while Atlas
(unreferenced in the book) has attempted for many years to push formal
semanticists to swallow this bitter pill. But beginning in the early 1980s a slow
realization of the extent of contextual determination of propositional content
had begun to dawn on all concerned with the theory of meaning. AI workers
dubbed the process of propositional determination 'local pragmatics'
(Hobbs & Martin, 1987; Pereira & Pollack, 1988) and GCI theorists (Atlas,
1979; Levinson, 1987 b) had independently or by osmosis come to similar
conclusions. Formal semantics too underwent drastic modifications in
different directions in the hope of dealing with such contextual determination,
giving rise on the one hand to Discourse Representation Theory or DRT (see
Kamp, 1981, and the closely related File Change Semantics of Heim, 1982),
and on the other to Situation Semantics (Barwise & Perry, 1983). Sperber
and Wilson (working quite independently, judging from the absence of
reference to all these developments) have pushed the issue somewhat further
though: their claim is that not only is there wide pragmatic input into
semantic interpretation (now generally acknowledged) but also that the VERY
SAME PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLES (according to Sperber and Wilson, R of course)
are involved in propositional determination and classic implicature gen-
eration (a view more likely to be resisted, for instance in Situation
Semantics).24 Sperber and Wilson would seem to be correct, although
it is actually easier to show the systematicity of the intrusion of implicatures
into semantic interpretation by looking at GCIs rather than Relevance
implicatures (Levinson & Sag, in prep; Levinson, 1988).
If Sperber and Wilson are correct, the overall structure of the theory of
meaning needs rethinking. Sperber and Wilson are Fodoreans, so they are
forced into assuming that language is an input system delivering fragmentary,
uninterpreted, logical forms to the central processor which is unable to feed
information back to the input system. It follows that semantics, construed as
part of the input system, has nothing to say about semantic interpretation,
which actually belongs (like pragmatics and all nonspecialized processes) to
the central processor. So virtually all the pre-occupations of modern
[24] The idea that implicature might play a crucial role in the determination of the proposition
expressed by an utterance (and thus in the circumscription of its truth-conditions) is not
in fact new. Indeed, L. Jonathan Cohen (1971) in an early critique of Grice, pointed out
that this might be an unavoidable consequence of the Gricean programme. But the real
credit for maintaining this view consistently when it was least popular surely belongs to Jay
Atlas (1977; 1979: 275-279; 1989: 146 ff.). The idea was also gingerly explored by Wilson
(1975:150 ff.), and more robustly by Gazdar in the conclusions to his 1979 book; and,
more recently and partly drawing on Sperber and Wilson's work, by Kempson (1986),
Carston (1988), Levinson (1988), Levinson & Sag (in prep).
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theoretical semantics will lie outside semantics proper; indeed they will not
be distinguished from general thought processes, let alone from pragmatics.
This conclusion is not necessary, and it is not natural. Instead, the evidence
on which it is based constitutes good prima facie evidence against
Fodoreanism, as does the previously mentioned difficulty with using R (a
central process) to disambiguate the input as it comes in, so guiding the
processing of the input device. We can maintain a systematic theory of
meaning by adopting, as in garden-variety DRT, a level of representation to
which both semantic and pragmatic modules can contribute, the whole
being subject to semantic interpretation. This is theoretical modularity
without Fodorean modularity. This solution is explored in largely in-
dependent work by Kadmon (1987), Levinson (1988) and van der Sandt
(1988).
There are thus reasonably well worked out alternatives to the theory of R:
theories that attempt to capture some of the content of pre-theoretical
judgments of relevance, theories of non-monotonic inference, theories of
generalized implicature that pre-empt Sperber and Wilson's 'explicatures',
theories about the interaction of pragmatics and semantics in semantic
interpretation. Each of these is closely attuned to intuition and data. True,
these are not all bundled up as a single package. But then, for many of us,
the discovery of lots of different aspects of meaning, each with its different
properties, is exactly what has characterized recent progress in the theory of
meaning.
4. C O N C L U S I O N S
This book is an ambitious bid for a paradigm-change in pragmatics. In the
old paradigm, pragmatics is an untidy collection of usage principles, accrued
over decades of careful observation, which together give some substantial
account of uncoded utterance-meaning (see Levinson, 1983; Horn, 1988, for
a survey). It may be a bit ramshackle, but it delivers the goods (or at least
some of them); and new developments (as mentioned in the prior section)
help to remedy deficiencies. In contrast, in the new paradigm we are being
offered, pragmatics is reduced to a single cognitive principle, a mental reflex,
which governs much else besides language use. Indeed, on the new paradigm,
pragmatics (along with most of what is now considered semantics) disappears
in a simple theory of general thought process (see Wilson & Sperber, 1986).
Despite reassurances otherwise, it is obvious that phenomena central to one
paradigm will be peripheral to the other; the coverage cannot be the same,
indeed in the new paradigm it is not yet really clear what constitutes the
fundamental data, for it is not a data-driven theory. Thus, the new paradigm
offered here exists largely as manifesto. Some, like Isaiah Berlin's hedgehog,
will find the bold simplicity attractive and will not be unduly worried by the
gap between manifesto and programme; others, more like his fox, will be
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infinitely suspicious, believing that nothing is simple in the theory of
meaning, and they will find plenty here to be suspicious about.25 Hedgehogs
can diet on this book; foxes will be much cheered to hear that there is a
marvellous feast of pragmatic complexities about to appear as antidote in
Horn (1989). As Abraham Lincoln said of another book that galvanized
opinion, 'People who like this sort of thing will find this the sort of thing they
like.'





Allen, J. (1983). Recognizing intentions from natural language utterances. In Brady, M. &
Berwick, R. (eds) Computational models of discourse. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 107-164.
Atlas, J. (1977). Negation, ambiguity and presupposition. Linguistics and Philosophy 1. 321-336.
Atlas, J. (1979). How linguistics matters to philosophy: presupposition, truth and meaning. In
Oh, C.-K. & Dinneen, D. (eds) Syntax and semantics 11: Presupposition. New York:
Academic Press. 265-281.
Atlas, J. (1989). Philosophy without ambiguity. Oxford University Press.
Atlas, J. & Levinson, S. (1981). //-clefts, informativeness and logical form. In Cole, P. (ed.)
Radical pragmatics. New York: Academic Press. 1—61.
Barwise, J. & Perry, J. (1983). Situations and attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Berlin, I. (1978). Russian thinkers. London: The Hogarth Press.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences {BBS) 1987, 10: 710-754. Sperber & Wilson: Relevance: Open
Peer Commentary.
Blakemore, D. (1987). Semantic constraints on relevance. Oxford: Blackwells.
Brown, G. & Yule, G. (1983). Discourse analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carston, R. (1988). Implicature, explicature and truth-theoretic semantics. In Kempson, R. (ed.)
1988. Mental representations: the interface between language and reality. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 155-181.
Cohen, L. J. (1971). The logical particles of natural language. In Bar-Hillel, Y. (ed.) Pragmatics
of natural language. Dordrecht: Reidel. 50-68.
Dascal, M. (1977). Conversational relevance. Journal of Pragmatics 1. 309-328.
Fodor, J. (1983). Modularity of mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Gazdar, G. (1979). Pragmatics: implicature, presupposition and logical form. New York:
Academic Press.
Gazdar, G. & Good, D. (1982). On a notion of relevance. In Smith, N. (ed.) Mutual knowledge.
New York: Academic Press. 88-100.
Ginsberg, M. L. (ed.) (1987). Readings in non-monotonic reasoning. Los Altos, Ca.: Morgan
Kaufmann.
Gumperz, G. (1983). Discourse strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haegeman, L. (this volume). Be going to and will: a pragmatic account. JL 25. 291-317.
Heim, I. (1982). The semantics of definite and indefinite noun phrases. Unpublished PhD.
dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Hirschberg, J. (1985). A theory of scalar implicature. University of Pennsylvania, Moore School
of Engineering, MS-CIS-85-56.
[25] 'There is a line among the fragments of the Greek poet Archilochus which says "The fox
knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing "...taken figuratively, the
words can be made to yield a sense in which they mark one of the deepest differences which
divide writers and thinkers... For there exists a great chasm between, on the one side, those
who relate everything to a single central vision... and, on the other, those who pursue many
ends' (Berlin, 1978: 22).
470
REVIEW ARTICLE
Hirschberg, J. (in press). A theory of scalar implicature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hobbs, J. (1987). Implicature and definite reference. Stanford, CSLI Report NO. CSLI-87-99.
Hobbs, J. & Martin, P. (1987). Local pragmatics. Proceedings, International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence. Milan, August 1987. 520-523.
Holdcroft, D. (1987). Conversational relevance. In Verschueren & Bertuccelli-Papi (1987).
477-496.
Horn, L. (1972). On the semantic properties of the logical operators in English. Indiana
University Linguistics Club.
Horn, L. (1983). Greek Grice. Papers from the gth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistics
Society, 205-214.
Horn, L. (1984). Towards a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference. In Schiffrin, D. (ed.)
Meaning, form, and use in context. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 11-42.
Horn, L. (1985). Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity. Lg 61. 121-174.
Horn, L. (1988). Pragmatic theory. In Newmeyer, F. (ed.) Linguistics: the Cambridge survey,
Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 113-145.
Horn, L. (1989). A natural history of negation. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Johnson-Laird, P. (1983). Mental models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kadmon, N. (1987). On unique and non-unique reference and asymmetric quantification.
Unpublished PhD., University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Kamp, H. (1981). A theory of truth and semantic representation. Reprinted in Groenendijk, J.
& Janssen, T. & Stokhof, M. (1984). Truth, interpretation and information. Dordrecht: Foris.
1-41.
Kempson, R. (1986). Ambiguity and the semantics-pragmatics distinction, In Travis, C. (ed.)
Meaning and interpretation, Oxford: Blackwells. 77-104.
Kempson, R. (1988). Grammar and conversational principles. In Newmeyer, F. (ed.) Linguistics:
the Cambridge survey, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 139-163.
Kempson, R. & Cormack, A. (1981). Ambiguity and quantification. Linguistics & Philosophy 4.
Levinson, S. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levinson, S. (1985). What's special about conversational inference? Unpublished paper
presented to the Annual Meeting of the British Psychological Society, April 1985, University
College, Swansea.
Levinson, S. (1987 a). Pragmatics and the grammar of anaphora. JL 23. 379-434.
Levinson, S. (1987b). Minimization and conversational inference. In Verschueren & Bertuccelli-
Papi (1987). 61-130.
Levinson, S. (1988). Generalized conversational implicature and the semantics/pragmatics
interface. MS. University of Cambridge.
Levinson, S. & Sag, I. (in prep.) Pragmatic inference and semantic interpretation.
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
McCafferty, A. (1987). Reasoning about implicature. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University
of Pittsburgh.
Pereira, F. & Pollack, M. (1988). An integrated framework for semantic and pragmatic
interpretation. Menlo park: SRI International, Technical Note.
Perrault, C. R. (1987). An application of default logic to speech act theory. To appear in Cohen,
P. Morgan, J. & Pollack, M. (eds) Plans and intentions in communication and discourse.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Pollack, M. (1986). Inferring domain plans in question-answering. Menlo Park: SRI International,
Technical Note 403.
Sadock, J. (1986). Remarks on the paper by Wilson and Sperber. Papers from the parasession
on pragmatics and grammatical theory. Chicago Linguistic Society, 22, Part 2. 85-90.
Schiffer, S. (1972). Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Seuren, P. (1988). The self-styling of Relevance Theory. Journal of Semantics 5. 123-143.
Sidner, C. (1986). Focusing in the comprehension of definite anaphora. In Grosz, B., Sparck
Jones, K., Webber, B. (eds) Readings in natural language processing. Los Altos, Ca.: Morgan
Kaufmann. 363-394.
Silverstein, M. (1988). The indeterminacy of contextualization: when is enough enough? Paper
presented to the conference 'The contextualization of language', October 1988, Konstanz.
Smith, N. (1981). Grammaticality, time and tense. In The Psychological mechanisms of language.
London: The Royal Society and the British Academy. 39-51.
471 17-2
JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS
Smith, N. (ed.) (1982). Mutual knowledge. London: Academic Press.
Smith, N. & Smith, A. (1988). A relevance-theoretic account of conditionals. In Hyman, L.
& Li, C. N. (eds) Language, speech and mind: Studies in honour of Victoria A. Fromkin.
London and New York: Routledge. 322-352.
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1982). Mutual knowledge and relevance in theories of comprehension.
In Smith, N. (ed.) (1982). 61-131.
Strawson, P. (1952). Introduction to logical theory. London: Methuen.
Thomason, R. (1987). Accommodation, meaning and implicatures: interdisciplinary founda-
tions for pragmatics. MS, University of Pittsburgh. To appear in Cohen, P., Morgan, J., &
Pollack, M. (eds) Plans and intentions in communication and discourse. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
Verschueren, J. & Bertuccelli-Papi, M. (eds) (1987). The pragmatic perspective. Amsterdam:
John Benjamins,
van der Sandt, R. (1988). Discourse systems and echo-quotation. MS, University of Nijmegen,
Dept. of Philosophy.
Wilson, D. (1975). Presuppositions and non-truth-conditional semantics. London: Academic Press.
Wilson, D. & Sperber, D. (1981). On Grice's theory of conversation. In Werth, P. Conversation
and discourse. London: Croom Helm.
Wilson, D. & Sperber, D. (1986). Pragmatics and modularity. Papers from the parasession on
pragmatics and grammatical theory. Chicago Linguistics Society, 22, Part 2. 67-84.
Zipf, G. K. (1949). Human behavior and the principle of least human effort. Cambridge, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley.
472
